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Many studies in international development demonstrate that foreign aid is not 
simply distributed according to the needs of developing countries. Bilateral Official 
Development Assistance allocation for example is often dictated by donor interests that 
are not directly connected to development. This paper uses regression analysis to 
identify the donor interests involved in bilateral aid distribution, or in other words, what 
factors matter to each donor country’s aid allocation and how much each factor 
contributes to the amount a donor allocates. The sample consists of the four leading 
donors: the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, and Canada. Results show that U.S. 
aid is mainly dictated by global strategic concerns which can be hardly explained by the 
U.S.’ political, economic, or regional interests, and Japan’s aid allocation is largely 
driven by its preference for Asia and former colonies. Similarly, U.K. aid can be 
explained by preference for former colonies and political concerns. Canadian aid, on the 
other hand, primarily considers the humanitarian needs of recipient countries.  
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Foreign aid, specifically Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been an 
integral part of international cooperation, and has greatly contributed to the 
improvement of quality of life around the world. Despite the amazing pace of 
development in certain region like Asia, some development problems— such as the 
HIV/AIDS situation in Africa— have not met with much success. With today’s pace of 
development, some of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are not likely to be 
achieved by the promised year of 2015. Therefore, not only multinational organizations 
but also governments of industrialized countries are now facing a great responsibility to 
improve their contribution for international development. 
All industrialized countries without exception provide ODA to a wide variety of 
countries, but there are distinctly different characteristics in the aid distribution patterns 
of each donor country. The choice of recipient countries as well as the amount 
distributed to them differs greatly across donor countries, often reflecting economic, 
cultural, historical, and geo-political strategies of the respective donor country. Due to 
this interesting difference in donor behaviors, aid distribution has been one of the most 
popular topics among the international development community. 
In this paper, I use regression analysis to identify the differences in donor interests 
behind bilateral ODA distribution. By using this statistical method, this paper analyzes 
what factors actually matter for aid allocation and how much each factor contributes to 
the amount a donor allocates. This study mainly uses 2003 data for all developing 
countries and several transition countries for which sufficient data is available. Four 
major bilateral aid donor countries, the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, and 
Canada, were selected as sample donor countries for three reasons: firstly because they 
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are the leading ODA donors, secondly because of data availability, and finally to secure 
regional, historical, and political variation in the donor sample.  
Another purpose of this research is to verify popular views on bilateral donors’ aid 
distribution practices often discussed in the development community. Japan’s ODA, for 
example, is often severely criticized for prioritizing its own economic interests rather 
than that of developing countries. In contrast, the U.S. is often praised for providing 
more assistance to countries with high Basic Human Needs (BHN). Are these 
widespread perceptions of donor behavior held by non-economists consistent with 
empirical evidence? I analyze their accuracy using regression analysis. 
Previous papers analyzing differences in aid flow and donor interests demonstrate 
that there are several determinants of aid allocation among both multilateral and 
bilateral donors. GDP per capita and population are variables most frequently identified 
as significantly important in both multilateral and bilateral aid distribution in the 
literature, but political interests, such as UN voting similarity, and economic interests, 
such as balance of payments, also seem to matter significantly for bilateral aid 
allocation. This paper incorporates only the key significant variables identified from 
previous analysis, as well as some original variables in order to estimate a 
comprehensive model of bilateral donor behavior. 
The key finding in this paper is that the pattern of bilateral aid distribution can be 
mostly explained by donor interests rather than recipient countries’ need. Each bilateral 
donor has a different set of determinants which is generally consistent with previous 
research. For example, U.S. aid is dictated by the U.S.’s global strategic concerns which 
can be hardly expressed econometrically, since there is no explicit relationship between 
preferred countries except their importance as global strongholds. Japanese aid is 
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mainly determined by colonial ties and strong preference for Asia and U.K. aid 
allocation is generally explained by colonial ties and British political concerns. 
Canadian aid distribution pattern is somewhat unique, because Canada primarily 
considers the humanitarian needs of recipient countries rather than its own economic or 
political well-being. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) 
According to Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
ODA is defined as the transfer of resources on concessional terms from one country to 
another country so as to promote the development of the latter. ODA is conducted by a 
donor country’s official agency with its national budget, and has to include at least 25 
percent grant element for the promotion of economic development and welfare.  
ODA plays an essential role in development cooperation. The net ODA to 
developing countries from the set of major ODA donor countries, called Development 
Assistant Committee member countries, piled up to USD 69.0 billion in 2003, and 79.5 
billion in 2004 (OECD). ODA can be bilateral or multilateral. Bilateral ODA, which 
accounts for 72 percent of the total ODA in 2003, flows from a donor country to a 
developing country through the official donor agency, and multilateral ODA flows to a 
donor country to an international organization such as U.N.  
Figure 1 shows the composition of net official ODA (including both multilateral 
and bilateral ODA) in 2004 by leading bilateral donors. The U.S. provides the largest 
amount of USD 19.7 billion, which is a quarter of the total net ODA. Japan, France, 
U.K. and Germany provide approximately ten percent of the total ODA (exact amount 
for Japan, U.K. reported later in this section), then other smaller European countries as 
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well as Canada follow. The U.S. has been the single largest ODA donor since 2001 













Figure 1. Net ODA in 2004 
Source: OECD Website 
 
Both the allocation pattern and the amount of bilateral ODA differ greatly across 
donor countries since each donor has different aid philosophy, policies, management 
systems, and allocation priorities. Although the primary goal of development assistance 
is to promote development and welfare of the developing nations, most bilateral donors 
consider their ODA a powerful diplomatic tool to shape political and often economic 











































Figure 2. Long term trend in net ODA among the leading donor countries 
Source: OECD Website 
 
i. United States 
The United States provides the largest amount of ODA, USD 19.7 billion. 
Although the amount may seem large, its ODA to Gross National Income (GNI) ratio 
was only 0.17% in 2004, the lowest among developed donor countries. In the same year, 
relatively high share of 82% is allocated for bilateral ODA (see Figure 3). 
 One of the major characteristics of the U.S. ODA often discussed in the aid 
studies is that this aid is historically closely related to U.S.’s foreign policy, promoting 























“freedom” in the world and securing democracy. This distribution pattern originates in 
the East-West confrontation during the Cold War, since the U.S. strategically provided 
hefty assistance to certain regions to protect their “freedom” from the communists 
(Nishigaki and Shimomura, p.127). Still today, promoting democratic governance is 
identified as a main aid policy in the very first chapter of the report “Foreign Aid in the 
National Interest” by U.S. Agency for International Development. The U.S.’s interests 
in democracy building can be also linked to their active political involvement in global 
peacemaking processes. This trend can be observed from the list of the major recipient 
countries of U.S. aid (Figure 3). Strategically located countries such as Iraq, Egypt, and 
Israel receive relatively greater amount of U.S. aid today. One critical argument about 
this particular trend is that the U.S. ODA distribution pattern might fluctuate greatly 
depending on the global and domestic political trends.  
Another aid priority of the U.S. often mentioned is its strong commitment to fulfill 
Basic Human Needs (BHN) of developing regions. According to the Development 
Co-operation Review of the United States by OECD, the U.S. traditionally allocates a 
large and increasing amount of assistance in social infrastructure and services, namely 
education and health sectors. Strong foreign aid policies focused on eradication of 
targeted diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria and the establishment of basic 
education system are currently in effect, according to the USAID website. Hence the 
U.S. must have higher priority in providing more assistance to countries with low levels 
of education and health. 
In addition to these characteristics, some scholars also mention that there is an 
increasing pressure to link ODA with commercial interests in order to improve the U.S. 
trade balance (Nishigaki and Shimomura, p131). 
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Figure 3. United States ODA 
 
ii. Japan 
Japan’s ODA as well as its ODA to GNI ratio has been declining since the 
beginning of 1990s, partly due to the prolonged recession (Earthscan, p.54). Japan 
dropped down to the second largest donor five years ago, and the difference with the top 
donor, U.S. continues to widen. In 2004, 66% of the total ODA was allocated for 
bilateral aid. 
Characteristics of Japan’s ODA frequently cited are strong regional preference and 
economic interests. In fact such preference for Asian countries is clearly indicated in its 
ODA Charter provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The charter 
describes Japan’s priority region as “Asia, a region with close relationship to Japan and 
which can have a major impact on Japan’s stability and prosperity” (MOFA). Most of 
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the top recipients of Japan’s ODA shown in the Figure 4 are located in Asia, and about 
61 percent of ODA is allocated for Asian countries (OECD). This geographical 
distribution of Japan’s ODA has been the same historically, and it is likely to continue 
in the future (Nishigaki and Shinomura, p.213). The main cause of this pattern is of 
course geographical proximity as well as Japan’s strong historical ties to other Asian 
countries during the World War II.   
Japan’s ODA is also frequently characterized as prioritizing its economic 
well-being rather than that of the developing country by allocating ODA in a way that 
benefits Japanese business activities abroad. This sort of development assistance is 
called tied aid, that is, it requires the involvement of corporations from the donor 
country. According to Arnold Padilla, a researcher at IBON foundation in the 
Philippines, although Japan’s average tied aid ratio is less than most of the other donor 
countries, there is an increasing domestic pressure to re-tie Japan’s ODA and Japanese 
corporations abroad due to the recession (as in fact, Japan’s ODA amount is declining 
mostly due to this pressure). In addition, the large percentage of Japan’s ODA is spent 
for the infrastructure development, where many Japanese businesses can participate and 
profit (The Reality of Aid, p.57). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume Japan’s ODA has 
some commercial interests.  
Partially due to the characteristic discussed above, Japan is also frequently 
criticized for not working toward poverty elimination. Akio Takayanagi from the 
Japanese NGO Center for International Cooperation writes in “The Reality of Aid” that 
despite the Japanese government’s reconfirmation of their commitment to the 
improvement of BHN, actual allocation to sectors such as education, health, population, 
and water stays quite low (p. 57). Japan’s mainstream ODA is still targeted towards 
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economic infrastructure rather than poverty elimination. Hence Japan often gets 
severely criticized for insufficient effort in BHN improvement. 
 
 
Figure 4 Japan’s ODA 
 
iii. United Kingdom 
Providing USD 7.8 billion of foreign aid, British ODA is significantly smaller in 
size compared to the U.S. and Japan. Similar to many of the other European donors, 
British ODA is well known to have strong emphasis on former colonies and 
commonwealth countries that have achieved independence, even though such a regional 
priority is not officially promoted. Most of the countries listed on the top ten recipients 
of U.K. ODA are the countries with strong historical ties (Figure 5).  
The U.K. is often praised for allocating great amount of ODA to the Least 
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Developed Countries (LDCs) in sub-Saharan Africa, so it might seem reasonable to 
think U.K. has greater interests in tackling the issues of poverty alleviation. In fact, U.K. 
has allocated almost 44 % of its total ODA to the Least Developed Countries (see 
Figure 5). However, such distribution outcome can be considered a consequence of its 
preference for former colonies since many colonies happen to be located in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In fact, U.K. does not seem to allocate much towards African countries which 
are former colonies of other European countries (Nishigaki and Shinomura, p.134).  
Another characteristic of British ODA may be its great emphasis on basic social 
services, similar to U.S. According to the Development Co-operation Review of the 
United Kingdom by OECD, U.K. allocated ten percent of its ODA to the basic 
education, basic health, and basic population programs, which is much higher than the  
        
 
Figure 5. United Kingdom ODA 
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DAC countries average of five percent. Therefore, U.K. might have interests in offering 
more assistance to the countries in need of basic social services. 
 
iv. Canada 
Compared to the other three donor countries, Canada has relatively less political, 
economic or historical ties to developing countries due to its smaller economic and 
political presence in the world. Moreover, the amount of Canadian ODA is relatively 
small (USD 2.6 billion in 2004), so it is possible that Canada does not consider or 
practice ODA as a powerful diplomatic tool as much as other donors do. Therefore, 
Canada’s allocation pattern is often considered “good” in the sense that it is responsive 
to the factors that make aid more effective for poverty alleviation, rather than factors 
that favor Canada’s political or economic environment. I included Canada in the sample 
donor countries to observe a distribution pattern relatively free from strategic foreign 
policy considerations.  
However, some regional priorities are strictly instructed by Canadian International 
Development Agency. African countries are more likely to be prioritized because of 
their least progress in development (OECD, Review of Canada). In addition, Canadian 
aid program reflects “trinity of mixed motives”, according to Macdonald and Hoddinott 
(2004). The three motives for aid distribution of Canada include humanitarian, political, 
and commercial considerations. Thus, while Canada is relatively free from biases, they 
do have distinct priorities in their bilateral aid distribution. 
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Figure 6. Canada ODA 
 
III. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The literature on foreign aid can be categorized into two types. One discusses the 
effectiveness of aid and the other studies aid allocation. This study focuses on the latter: 
what factors do donors prioritize in bilateral aid distribution and to what degree?  
The fact that determinants of multilateral and bilateral aid are completely different 
and bilateral aid is far more likely to be affected by donor’s strategic interests, which are 
not necessarily related to humanitarian need of the recipient countries, is demonstrated 
by some early contribution to the aid literature. For example, McKinlay and Little (1977, 
1978) constructed multiple regression models, each one composed of a group of 
variables that capture a range of donor interests such as ‘overseas economic interests’, 
‘security interests’, ‘power political interests’, ‘political stability and democracy’ and 
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also variables that capture the genuine need of recipient countries. They found the 
bilateral aid allocation pattern can be explained significantly better by donor interests 
than recipient needs. In their analysis of individual donors, U.S. aid distribution was 
found to be explained mainly by ‘power political interests’ and ‘security interests’, and 
U.K. aid was found to be explained by political interests, historical interests, 
antagonism to Communism (during 1960-70), and preference for countries with 
multi-party democratic regimes. 
Using a similar ‘donor interest’ model, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) meticulously 
analyzed the allocation practices of the five principal donors: U.S., France, Germany, 
Japan, and Britain. They analyzed three types of donor interests: (i) political/security 
interests, measured by the extent of arms transfers, (ii) investment interests measured by 
stock of private direct investment, and (iii) trade interest, incorporated via a dummy 
variable on whether a recipient country exports strategic materials. U.S. aid allocation 
was again found to be closely associated with political/security interests, Japanese aid 
responded to regional interest in Asia and trading interest, and British aid was explained 
well by trading interests. 
Alesina and Dollar (2000), the authors of “Who gives foreign aid to whom and 
why?”, a leading paper in the aid literature, emphasize that the aid distribution of 
bilateral donors do not optimize aid effectiveness since political and global strategic 
concerns of donor countries’ explain the aid distribution much more than the recipient 
country’s political and economic efforts toward poverty reduction. Their OLS 
estimation using data on aggregate bilateral aid flow from 1970 to 1994 identified 
variables such as the UN General Assembly voting pattern and the duration of colonial 
occupation, as the key determinants of bilateral aid distribution, while variables 
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measuring democracy and good policy of the recipient country do not seem to explain 
as much. Although the coefficients of independent variables such as civil liberties, trade 
openness, direct foreign investment flow, income level, and population were all fairly 
significant in most donors, they do not have as much explanatory power as UN voting 
pattern and colonial occupation. Religious differences were also included in the 
estimation model to account for cultural affinity, but the similarity of religion between a 
donor and a recipient country does not seem to influence the aid flow either. Infant 
morality was marginally significant as a determinant as well. 
Alesina and Dollar also conducted individual donor analysis including the U.S., 
Japan, and U.K. Considerable difference in donor interests can be observed from their 
regression results: U.S. has distributed overwhelmingly to Egypt and Israel, Japan’s aid 
has highly correlated with the UN voting pattern, and U.K. has prioritized its former 
colonies exclusively. Although Japanese and British aid have little relationship to the 
measures of development progress of a recipient country such as poverty even after 
controlling for their major interests, U.S. aid seems to be targeted at poverty, democracy, 
and trade openness, according to their results. 
In a framework similar to Alesina and Dollar (2000), the determinants of 
Canadian bilateral aid allocation over the period 1984 to 2000 were examined by 
Macdonald and Hoddinott (2004). They found that Canada allocates slightly more to 
countries with high economic inequality, and/or countries with good human rights. 
Countries with a greater volume of imports from Canada were also shown to receive 
greater levels of Canadian bilateral aid. 
Slightly from a different perspective, Dollar and Levin (2004) discuss two 
determinants in particular, policy selectivity and poverty selectivity, using very a simple 
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regression model consisting of population, per capita GDP, and an index of sound 
institution/policy. Policy selectivity measures how much good institution/policy in a 
recipient country dictates the donor’s aid flow. Poverty selectivity similarly measures 
how much poverty matters to the aid distribution. Their result shows that aid from most 
of the European donors including U.K. are both policy and poverty selective, but U.S. is 
not selective in either perspective. Japan, on the contrary, is highly selective in terms of 
policy environment, but not poverty. 
 In conclusion, there is some consensus in the aid literature about what interests 
dictate bilateral aid allocation patterns in general. Donors seem to allocate aid in a way 
that serves their country’s interests in military alliance, trade, investment, international 
politics, and colonial ties. Although the needs of recipient countries have a small role to 
play in bilateral aid distribution, their policy environment seems to matter for some 
donors.  
The donor specific determinants studied in previous papers vary for two reasons. 
One is that the predicted donor interest variables employed in regression models greatly 
differ across the literature. For example, a donor’s economic interest may have been 
observed to be a significant variable in one study simply because some other 
determinants, such as political interests and regional interests, were excluded in the 
estimation model. Another possible reason is that each study uses a different index to 
measure donor interests. There is no uniform method to measure political interest or 
cultural similarity, so the difference in measurements might have led to different results. 
The estimation model of this paper includes the key determinants highlighted in the 
literature as well as other variables that capture new measures of development and have 
not included in previous studies. I compared the different indices that have been used to 
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measure donor interests with new indices that are now available, and employed the one 
which reflects the donor’s interest most accurately. 
 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
i. Estimation Strategy 
In order to study the determinants of foreign aid distribution and understand the 
difference in donor interests, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. 
OLS is the most commonly used method to obtain a numerical value for the degree of 
influence that a single independent variable has on a dependent variable, controlling all 
else equal. The calculated coefficient indicates the size of the influence of the 
independent variable; so the bigger the coefficient is, the stronger the impact of 
independent variable is.  
The dependent variable is the amount of ODA from each donor, and the 
independent variables will consist of variables I hypothesize to be the determinants of 
aid distribution. If the independent variables turned out to have coefficients that are 
higher than a certain level of probability, then such variables are shown to play a 
significant role in determining the aid allocation. 
The sample contains 92 developing countries receiving bilateral foreign aid for 
which all the data on the independent variables are available. The most recent data of 
2003 was used for all the independent variables except the democracy index, the 
ethnolinguistics fractionalization index, and the UN voting pattern. The dependent 
variable, total ODA amount, and the three independent variables, GDP per capita, total 
population, and the volume of export, are taken in the form of logarithm to make the 
sample distribution less skewed and thus avoid the statistical problem of 
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heteroscedasticity, which often arises from the wide disparity in the data set.  
 
ii. Dependent Variable 
The data on bilateral ODA for 2003 comes from the Geographical Distribution of 
Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, 1999-2003 of the OECD. This includes grants and 
low interest loans. The unit of this variable is million U.S. dollars. In some countries, 
this number turns out to be negative; some developing countries technically give more 
money to donor countries than they receive. This is because the recipient countries 
successfully repaid their financial aid debts. This debt payment for some developing 
countries such as Turkey and Thailand surpasses the aid they receive from donors. Such 
countries with negative ODA amount are eliminated from the estimation model in order 
to get more accurate statistical result. The exclusion of sample countries were more 
frequent among the U.S. aid recipients, hence the sample size of the U.S. estimation 
model is relatively small compared to the other donors. 
 
iii. Independent Variables 
Thirteen different independent variables were included in this research. Some of 
these variables are commonly used by the aid literature, but some are completely new 
variables whose relationships have not been statistically analyzed yet. The independent 
variables can be categorized into two groups: variables that indicate the characteristics 
of a recipient country and variables that represent a donor country’s strategic interests. 




Table 1. List of Independent Variables 
Characteristics of a Recipient Country 
Measurement of Human Development 
(HDI) 
GDP per capita (Income level) 
Literacy Rate (Education index) 
Infant Mortality Rate (Health index) 
Other Key Measurement of Development Population 
Number of Displaced People 
Ethnolinguistics Fractionalization 
GINI index (Income Inequality) 




Economic Interests Volume of Export 
Political Interests UN Voting Patterns 
Regional Interests Regional Dummy Variable 
Historical Relationship Colonial Past Dummy Variable 
 
 Characteristics of a Recipient Country 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita in US dollar 
The most important and frequently used variable in aid literature, GDP per capita, 
was included to represent a recipient country’s level of income. The relationship 
between GDP per capita and the amount of aid allocated is expected to be negative, 
because more foreign aid flows to poorer countries rather than richer countries. The data 
of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (US dollars) is obtained from the Human 





Education is one of the principal means to both human and economic development, 
since it greatly contributes to the quality of labor. As a proxy for a country’s overall 
level of education, the literacy rate from the HDR 2005 is used in the analysis. The data 
uses a scale of zero to one, with a higher number reflecting more education. This index 
is expected to have a negative sign since the lower the literacy rate, the higher the 
problem of underdevelopment. Although this variable is not commonly used in the aid 
flow literature, I include it to observe donor responses specifically to education level of 
the recipient countries. 
 
Infant Mortality Rate 
Basic health conditions of people in a developing country might also contribute to 
aid allocation decision making. Although both the infant mortality rate and life 
expectancy from the HDR 2005 were included in the initial estimation model, due to the 
high correlation between these two variables (correlation coefficient of 0.85), life 
expectancy was excluded to avoid potential statistical complications. The infant 
mortality rate represents the probability that a child dies between birth and one year of 
age, per thousand live births. The higher this rate is, the more foreign aid allocation a 
country should expect. Similar to the literacy rate, this variable is not a widely used as 
an independent variable in aid literature. 
 
Human Development Index (HDI) 
In order to observe the overall impact of Basic Human Needs in aid allocation, I 
created an additional regression model for each donor which includes Human 
Development Index from the HDR 2005 instead of GDP per capita, literacy rate, and 
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infant mortality rate. Human development is relatively a recent concept which was 
created to improve the widespread practice of measuring development exclusively in 
economic terms such as income levels. Human development can be defined as the 
development process that “expand(s) human capabilities by expanding the choices that 
people have to live full and creative lives” (HDR 2005, p.127). HDI is a composite 
measure of such development, and focuses on three dimensions: living a long and 
healthy life, being educated, and having a decent standard of living, namely life 
expectancy, adult literacy rate and gross enrolment rate, and GDP per capita (HDR 2005, 
p.127). Therefore, replacing GDP per capita, literacy rate, and infant mortality rate with 
HDI would enable us to observe whether a donor is concerned about the improvements 
of overall human development.  
In addition, HDI is increasingly viewed by the development community as the 
primary measure of development. However, the existing literature has not discussed the 
significance of this variable in aid allocation. HDI is reported on a scale of zero to one, 
with a low score indicating low levels of human development. The relationship of this 
variable with ODA allocation is expected to be negative if a donor prioritizes the 
improvement of human development. 
 
Total Population 
Total population is also well-known to have significant impact on aid allocation 
due to its strong correlation with a country’s economic development. All else equal, 
economic performances of very populous countries tend to be inferior to those of less 
populous countries (Neumeyer, 2005). Therefore, I expect the relationship between total 
population and aid allocation to be positive: more aid should be flowing to populous 
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and poor countries. Total population for 2003 was also obtained from UNDP’s Human 
Development Report 2005.  
 
Number of Displaced People 
Foreign aid, often in form of emergency aid, flows to countries that experienced 
natural disasters and conflicts. To account for this sort of aid flow, the dataset created 
by combining the data on the total number of refugees and the number of internally 
displaced people hosted in a country is used. Both of the original data are taken from the 
Human Development Report 2005. However, due to the volatile nature of the refugees, 
the report notes that the data is “the best possible estimate with high level of 
uncertainty” (214).  
 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index (1985) 
This index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization measures “the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals from the country in question will not belong to the same 
ethnic group” (Phillip, 2005). A greater degree of ethnic diversity within a country is 
known to be one of the causes of poverty, as we can see from many African nations. 
The intuition is that more ethnically diverse countries are more prone to instability and 
social conflicts; hence they require higher levels of government expenditure, 
particularly in law enforcement and policing activities. This higher fiscal requirement 
often becomes a burden that prevents a country from achieving faster economic growth 
and lead to poverty. 
The relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the ODA allocation is 
ambiguous due to the two dimensions of this variable. While positive correlation with a 
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country’s poverty level suggests that aid should flow to highly fractionalized and poor 
countries, donors might avoid politically unstable countries in social turmoil due to their 
bad governance and ineffectiveness of aid projects. This relationship has never 
discussed in previous aid studies, so the relationship cannot be hypothesized at this 
stage.  
 
Income Inequality— Gini index 
Huge disparities in income and living standard within a nation indicate the 
inefficient internal governance. Truly efficient government with sound policies would 
be able to build systems to distribute a country’s wealth more equally, so that it could 
maximize the speed of development. Therefore, high income inequality signals the need 
for more foreign aid to improve such internal systems. This study uses the most popular 
measurement of domestic economic inequality, Gini index. According to the HDR 2005, 
it measures “the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) among 
individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution” 
(188). It measures on a scale of zero to hundred with zero representing perfect equality 
and hundred representing perfect inequality. Therefore, a positive relationship with the 




Corruption or government transparency is a fairly popular concept in the 
development community today. Many bilateral donors publicly announce that they take 
institutional transparency of the recipient country’s government into serious 
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consideration, since higher corruption indicates an inability to manage aid projects 
effectively and efficiently. It is now the consensus of all the development community 
that aid works better in a good policy environment since aid effectiveness is only 
promised in such an environment (Klein and Harford, 2005). While the soundness of 
institutions and policies is a frequently used variable in aid literature, corruption data 
has not been directly used in exhibiting aid allocation research. Since policy soundness 
was not significant in most bilateral donors’ aid allocation (Dollar and Levin, 2004), 
this study alternatively uses the corruption rate to identify a statistical significance of 
such a policy environmental factor. The dataset from the Transparency International 
corruptions perceptions index 2003, which is composed of various international polls 
and surveys on perceptions on corruption in public sector, was included ( For the 
countries whose data was not available yet in 2003, the value in the latest available year 
was alternatively used). The index measures on a scale of zero to ten, with higher score 
representing more transparent governance. The relationship between this variable and 
the dependent variable is expected to be positive, since more aid supposedly flow to 
countries with more institutional transparency and good governance. 
 
Democracy Index (2005) 
The democracy index from the nonprofit organization, Freedom House, measures 
a country’s political and economic freedom on a scale of one to seven (the lower score 
indicates more freedom). This index is also used widely in aid distribution studies to 
measure political openness of a recipient country. Since some donors such as the U.S. 
strongly advocate and prioritize the democratization of developing countries, they might 
have interests in providing more aid to less democratized countries. Therefore, this 
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variable is expected to have a positive relationship with the aid allocation. 
 
Originally, the variable measuring the degree of poverty (population living under 
the national poverty line, from the HDR 2005) was included in the estimation model. It 
was subsequently dropped from the regression model since it is highly correlated with 
GDP per capita (correlation coefficient of 0.78) and potentially creates a problem of 
multicollinearity.  
 
 Donor Interests 
Volume of Exports of Goods and Services from Donor Country 
A wide variety of variables has been used to measure the degree of donors’ 
economic interests reflected in previous studies. Alesina and Dollar (2000) used trade 
openness, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) used the amount of private direct investment 
from a donor country, and Neumeyer (2005) used the total exports of goods and 
services from a donor country to a recipient country. This study uses the latter to 
measure economic and commercial interests of donors. The rationale for this choice is 
that the volume of international trade reflects the commercial relationship of the 
countries most accurately since trade openness and FDI are relatively more sensitive to 
recipient country’s domestic policies. The data for exports is obtained from U.S. Census 
Bureau (U.S.), Japan Ministry of Finance (Japan), U.K. Tradeinfo website (U.K.), and 
Canadian Trade Data Online at Strategis website (Canada). For donors that have a 
tendency to allocate more to their trade partners, that is, donors that promote their own 
economy by assisting countries which import a lot from them. This variable is expected 
to have a positive coefficient. 
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UN Voting Patterns (1996) 
Politics is an issue that cannot be separated from aid distribution, particularly for 
bilateral donors. For some bilateral donors, foreign aid might be just another diplomatic 
tool to promote global political alliances. To incorporate this political aspect into the aid 
distribution model, this study included a variable measuring a similarity in voting 
pattern in the UN General Assembly (Gartzke, Jo and Tucker). The higher this score is, 
the more two countries have similarity in political viewpoints. Some donors might have 
interests to use foreign aid to reward politically friendly countries and to further 
promote global network of political alliances. We can also think some donors might 
want to use aid as a tool to buy UN votes in favor of their country. Since regression 
analysis does not imply causation, the direction of the relationship between UN voting 
pattern and the aid allocation is not clear, but in both cases, the correlation between the 
UN voting pattern and the ODA allocation should be positive. However, it is noted that 
the UN votes might be meaningless, so the voting pattern does not reflect any donor 
interests. Nonetheless I included this variable since it is frequently used in key papers in 
the literature such as Alesina and Dollar’s. 
 
Regional Dummy Variable 
Some donors such as Japan are known to have specific regional interests; they 
distribute significantly more to one region of the world. To approximate this 
geographical interest, this study includes three regional dummy variables, Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. Dummy variables enable us to observe the degree of how much 
‘being in a region’ makes difference holding everything else constant.  
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Colonial Past Dummy Variable 
Some donors such as France and U.K. are widely known to have strong interests 
to distribute a larger amount to the countries with historical ties. According to Dollar 
and Alesina (2000), the share of aid during 1970 to 1994 going to countries that were 
the donor country’s colonies in the 20th century was 78.0% in United Kingdom, 6.3% in 
Japan, 2.9% in the United States, and zero for Canada. To account for this historical 
relationship, a dummy variable of whether a country has been colonized by a donor 
country was used in the analysis. This variable is not included in the estimation model 
of the U.S. and Canada since they have no or few colonies. The table 1 below is the list 
of the countries identified as former colonies of the U.K. and Japan in the sample 
countries used in this research.  
 
Table 2. Former Colony Countries of the U.K. and Japan included in the model  





































V.  RESULTS  
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i. United States 
The estimation result for U.S. aid allocation is presented in table 3. Only two 
variables are statistically significant in this regression analysis: the number of displaced 
people and the Africa and the Asia dummy variables. The coefficient of the displaced 
people is extremely small (0.001), and has virtually no effect on the aid distribution. 
This may be because only a small number of countries have experience problems of 
displacement, so the overall effect of the problem of displaced people on aid allocation 
is hardly observable. The coefficients of the regional dummy variables can be 
interpreted as follows. If a recipient country is located in Africa, the country receives 
4.1% more aid than countries in other regions. Similarly, Asian countries get 1.9% more 
assistance than countries in other regions. 
Literacy rate, infant mortality rate, democracy, and the volume of export were 
expected to be key determinants of U.S. aid according to the common recognition of 
U.S. aid allocation behavior, but all of such variables turned out to be statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, the popular arguments that the U.S. aid is specifically targeted 
at BHNs improvements, democratization, and/or its own economic welfare cannot be 
verified from the empirical evidence. 
The U.S. aid allocation pattern observed from the regression result is striking 
since none of the characteristics of a recipient country or donor’s own economic or 
political interests seem to determine its aid allocation. The value of R-squared is as low 
as 0.30, which means only 30% of the allocation is explained by the variables included 
in the model. I should also note that the value of R-squared in similar researches is also 
quite low both in absolute term and relative to other donors’ scores. Therefore, U.S.  




Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
    
  Variable Coefficient 
log(GDP per capita) 
 
-0.372 (-0.968)   
Literacy Rate 0.062 (0.936) HDI 0.858 (0.154) 
Infant Mortality Rate -0.005 (-0.429)   
Log(Population) 0.366 (0.857) Log(Population) 0.230 (0.420) 
Log(Export) 0.013 (0.045) Log(Export) 0.143 (0.494) 
Democracy -0.055 (-0.182) Democracy -0.109 (-0.395) 
Displaced People 0.001 (3.518)*** Displaced People 0.001 (3.786)*** 
Ethnolinguistics -0.662 (-0.545) Ethnolinguistics -0.702 (-0.579) 
Income Inequality -0.035 (-0.802) Income Inequality -0.050 (-1.032) 
Transparency -0.334 (-1.062) Transparency -0.427 (-1.310) 
UN vote similarity 2.278 (1.145) UN vote similarity 1.446 (0.887) 
Africa 4.103 (1.372)* Africa 3.135 (1.173)* 
Asia 1.997 (1.455)* Asia 1.752 (1.398)* 
Latin America 2.005 (1.123) Latin America 1.843 (1.031) 
    
    
    R-squared 0.308421 R-squared 0.293001 
Observations  85 Observations  85 
        
Note: Standard Errors calculated with White’s correction for heteroscedasticity.  
t-statistics in parentheses.  








aid distribution seems rather random since they do not have any set of determinants 
except some regional preferences to explain the allocation pattern. Why does this 
regression result show this randomness? 
The absence of the determinants in the regression model can be explained that the 
U.S. aid is distributed accordingly to their global strategic concerns, as number of 
previous papers concluded. Strategically important countries receive U.S. aid no matter 
which region, or what development characteristics they have, so there is no or little 
correlation between such recipients. As I have discussed in the previous section, 
countries like Egypt, Israel, and Iraq receive a great amount of assistance from the U.S., 
but there is little correlation between these countries except their importance as the U.S. 
global strategy. This hypothesis matches with the predominant views on U.S. aid 
distribution patterns in previous aid researches. 
 
ii. Japan 
The estimation result for Japan’s aid allocation is presented in table 4. The 
statistically significant variables are GDP per capita, population, Asia, and colonial past 
dummy variables. Displaced people variable was statistically significant, but the 
coefficient is extremely small, so there is virtually no effect on aid distribution.  
This result implies that Japan’s aid is distributed using the most traditional 
measurement of development such as GDP per capita and population. HDI was 
significant in the second regression result, but that is derived from the high significance  
of GDP per capita, since neither literacy rate nor infant mortality rate was statistically 
significant. All the other variables indicating the various characteristics of recipient 
countries were insignificant, hence Japan’s aid allocation seems to take only simplest  
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Table 4. OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable: Log of Japan’s Foreign Aid 2003 
  
  Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
    
  Variable Coefficient 
log(GDP per capita) 
 
-0.827 (-2.967)***   
Literacy Rate 0.027 (0.709)   HDI -5.312 (-2.132)** 
Infant Mortality Rate 0.001 (0.155)     
Log(Population) 0.592 (2.675)***   Log(Population) 0.443 (1.780)* 
Log(Export) -0.084 (-0.607)   Log(Export) 0.033 (0.233) 
Democracy -0.035 (-0.205)   Democracy -0.016 (-0.093) 
Displaced People  -0.000 (-2.321)**   Displaced People  -0.000 (-1.976)** 
Ethnolinguistics 1.061 (1.214)   Ethnolinguistics 0.941 (1.120) 
Income Inequality 0.025 (0.724)   Income Inequality 0.028 (0.933) 
Transparency 0.139 (0.701)   Transparency 0.088 (0.434) 
UN vote similarity 0.759 (0.395)   UN vote similarity 1.446 (0.887) 
Africa -0.664 (-0.687)   Africa -1.294 (-1.552)* 
Asia 2.194 (3.880)***   Asia 2.299 (4.430)*** 
Latin America -0.001 (-0.001)   Latin America 0.151 (0.158) 
Colonial Past 1.025(2.389)**   Colonial Past 0.736 (1.557)* 
    
    
    R-squared 0.479577 R-squared 0.469959 
Observations  91 Observations  91 
        
Note: Standard Errors calculated with White’s correction for heteroscedasticity.  
T-statistics in parentheses.  








characteristics of the recipient countries into consideration. 
As expected from both common conceptions and Japan’s foreign policy, Asian 
countries receive significantly more assistance from Japan. This high preference to 
Asian countries can be clearly observed from the regression result. Notice in the first 
regression result, although insignificant, the coefficients of Africa and Latin America 
variables are in fact negative, which means if a country is in Africa or Latin America, 
they tend to get less assistance from Japan than countries in other regions all else equal. 
Another expected determinant of Japan’s aid, colonial past can also be observed 
from the result fairly clearly. The first regression estimation shows that if a recipient 
country has a colonial relationship with Japan, the country receives 1.025 % more on 
average than other countries all else equal. Considering the relatively small number of 
Japanese former colony, the colonial past seems to have a fairly big impact on Japan’s 
aid distribution pattern. 
On the other hand, export was not statistically significant in both regression 
models. The common criticism that Japan’s aid is targeted exclusively at its own 
economic well-being cannot be confirmed from this regression model. One might argue 
that therefore such criticism are invalid, and in fact, only a weak association between 
Japan’s aid and their economic interests has been found in previous research. However, 
we could also think that the volume of export doesn’t accurately capture the commercial 
relationship. Japan’s aid may be correlated with other measures of commercial activities 
such as foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than export, since FDI works as substitute 
of export in general. Therefore, although Japan’s aid seems to have no correlation with 
the volume of trade, we do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that Japan’s aid is 
free of commercial interests without conducting further analysis. 
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iii. United Kingdom 
The estimation result for U.K. aid allocation is presented in table 5. The most 
number of variables was statistically significant from the U.K. regression result; infant 
mortality rate, population, democracy, income inequality, UN vote similarity, all the 
regional dummy variables, and colonial past dummy variable, which were fairly 
consistent with the literature. The coefficient of the infant morality rate has an 
unexpected sign, but the size of the coefficient is relatively small and it is rather 
reasonable to think the significance was a side effect and U.K. aid wasn’t specifically 
targeted at low infant morality rate countries. 
The common recognition of U.K. aid among both economists and non-economists, 
as having a traditionally strong preference of their former colony countries is 
empirically verified from the result. The colonial past variable is a key determinant of 
U.K. aid with very high significance. 
U.K. aid is also known to prioritize countries that lack BHN. If this claim is true, 
variables such as literacy rate, infant mortality, and income equality must be statistically 
significant. From the regression result, however, only income inequality seems to have 
an expected relationship with U.K. aid allocated. HDI, indicating the overall human 
development level, was not statistically significant as well, so U.K. seems to take BHN 
into consideration only for a small degree compared to other factors. 
Although not expected, the UN voting pattern and democracy seem to affect U.K. 
aid allocation. Especially the coefficient of the UN voting similarity is fairly large and 
has high statistical significance. This can be considered as the evidence that U.K. aid is 




Table 5. OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable: Log of U.K. Foreign Aid 2003 
  
  Variable Coefficient    Variable Coefficient 
    
  Variable Coefficient 





Literacy Rate -0.036 (-0.584)   HDI 6.680 (1.116) 
Infant Mortality Rate -0.035 (-2.562)**   
Log(Population) 1.170 (3.725)***    Log(Population)     1.301 (3.613)*** 
Log(Export) -0.487 (0.214)    Log(Export)  -0.570 (-2.235)** 
Democracy 0.457 (1.665)*    Democracy  0.441 (1.793)** 
Displaced People  -0.000 (-0.332)    Displaced People   -0.000 (-0.400) 
Ethnolinguistics 0.012 (0.009)    Ethnolinguistics  -0.112 (-0.087) 
Income Inequality -0.130 (-2.925)***    Income Inequality    -0.118 (-2.964)*** 
Transparency 0.269 (0.752)    Transparency 0.224 (0.647) 
UN vote similarity 6.787 (2.483)***    UN vote similarity   7.062 (2.652)** 
Africa 6.533 (3.328)***    Africa    6.680 (3.771)*** 
Asia 2.686 (2.416)**    Asia   2.125 (1.969)** 
Latin America 3.844 (3.030)***    Latin America    3.544 (-2.964)*** 
Colonial Past 2.018(2.965)***     Colonial Past   2.677 (4.089)*** 
    
    
    R-squared 0.505192 R-squared   0.483308 
Observations  92 Observations  92 
    
Note: Standard Errors calculated with White’s correction for heteroscedasticity.  
T-statistics in parentheses.  








world. Another rationale is that this is simply a consequence of U.K.’s strong preference 
for former colonies, since former colonies might have similar political views due to the 
long period of occupation. Both the variable measuring political interests and preference 
for democratic regime were once observed in McKinlay and Little’s regression model 
(1978) as well. 
 
iv. Canada 
The estimation result for Canadian aid allocation is presented in table 6. The 
determinants observed include population, income inequality, transparency, UN voting 
similarity, and all the regional dummy variables.  
Consistent with the literature, Canada aid is highly responsive to the recipient 
countries’ development levels rather than to its own interests. Although GDP per capita, 
literacy rate, and infant mortality rate were not significant, the combined variable of 
HDI turned out to be significant in the second regression model. Therefore, Canada 
allocates significantly larger amounts of ODA to countries with low level of human 
development, and/or countries with high income inequality. Considering that UN voting 
similarity is the only one variable which indicates donor interest and its coefficient as 
well as its significance is relatively small, we can conclude Canadian aid is definitely 
targeted towards development. Another interesting determinant of Canadian aid is 
transparency. Canadian ODA seems to be allocated efficiently to countries with less 
corruption.  
Among the three regions that were observed to have effect on aid allocation, 
both the coefficient and significance were highest in Latin America, followed by Africa 
and Asia. This can be interpreted that Latin American countries receive more because of  
geographical proximity, and African countries receive more since priority in African 
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nations is advocated by Canadian government as a foreign aid policy. 
 
 
Table 6. OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable: Log of Canada’s Foreign Aid 2003 
  
  Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
    
  Variable Coefficient 
log(GDP per capita) 
 
-0.304 (-1.298)   
Literacy Rate -0.017 (-0.693) HDI -3.843(-1.960)** 
Infant Mortality Rate -0.003 (-0.538)   
Log(Population) 0.678 (3.863)*** Log(Population) 0.617 (3.607)*** 
Log(Export) 0.004 (0.033) Log(Export) 0.051 (0.405) 
Democracy -0.118 (-0.914) Democracy -0.097 (-0.807) 
Displaced People  -0.000 (-1.176) Displaced People  -0.000 (-1.094) 
Ethnolinguistics 0.034 (0.061) Ethnolinguistics 0.029 (0.050) 
Income Inequality -0.041 (-2.587)** Income Inequality -0.031(-2.149)** 
Transparency -0.233 (-1.556)** Transparency -0.185 (-1.298) 
UN vote similarity 2.121 (1.587)* UN vote similarity 2.759 (2.066)** 
Africa 1.621 (2.286)** Africa 1.282 (1.948)** 
Asia 0.434 (1.059)* Asia 0.500 (1.222) 
Latin America 1.715 (3.588)*** Latin America 1.672 (3.740)*** 
    
    
    R-squared 0.559749 R-squared 0.568050 
Observations  91 Observations  91 
        
    
Note: Standard Errors calculated with White’s correction for heteroscedasticity.  
T-statistics in parentheses.  







Ⅵ .  DISCUSSION 
What determines bilateral aid distribution? The answer differs greatly by the 
donor country. Table 7 shows the complete list of observed determinants. Population 
and region are the most popular determinants in general, and they seem to play key roles 
explaining the allocation pattern in almost all the four donor countries. On the other 
hand, although there is an increasing number of discussion in development field that 
argue human development and transparency of the recipient country should dictate the 
bilateral aid allocation for a greater degree, they were not observed as the determinants 
of aid from the regression analysis. Ethnolinguistics fractionalization and most 
interestingly the very controversial variable, the volume of export, were not statistically 
significant in any estimation models. I have to note, however, that this analysis uses 
pooled data for 2003, which makes the sample size significantly smaller than previous 
papers. Therefore, it could be that this paper’s sample size is insufficient to identify the 
real determinants of aid distribution. Another explanation is that these variables may 
actually be important to aid distribution, but other variables such as the region and 
population matter so much more that these variables were not identifiable as proximate 
determinants.  
In terms of individual donors, all donors’ aid allocation except for Canada’s can 
be explained better by donor interest variables such as colonial ties, political similarity, 
and global strategic interests, which have very weak relationship with poverty reduction, 
policy soundness, or effective development strategies. Therefore, we can clearly see that 
the bilateral aid is really a strategic tool for donor countries. Aid allocation of the 
primary donors might be effective at promoting their own political interests or regional 
partnership, but might not be effective at promoting poverty alleviation.  
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Table 7: Summary of Observed Determinants of Bilateral ODA 

































Region(Africa, Asia) Region (Asia) 
Colonial past 
UN voting similarity 
Region (All) 
Colonial Past 





VII. CONCLUSIONS  
The determinants of bilateral aid distribution differ greatly across donors. 
However, it is clear that a donor country’s own interests play at least some role. U.S. aid 
seems to be dictated by their global strategic concerns, which are fairly irrelevant to the 
recipient country’s need or their own commercial interests. Emphasis on the 
improvement of education and health conditions advocated by U.S. foreign policy and 
USAID was not statistically significant. Japanese aid is largely determined by colonial 
ties and preference for Asia. Despite the persistent criticism of Japan’s prioritizing its 
own economic interests in aid-giving, trade volume does not affect the distribution 
pattern significantly in the regression model. U.K. aid is generally explained by colonial 
ties and political concerns, which is fairly consistent with the previous researches and 
common perceptions of the development practitioners. Canadian aid distribution is 
unique in a way that it is primarily allocated based on the humanitarian needs of 
recipient countries rather than Canada’s own interests. This may be partially due to its 
lack of strong historical or regional ties with developing nations.  
Although the improvement of transparency of the government and human 
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development are strongly encouraged by major international organizations like World 
Bank, such variables do not seem to have statistically significant impact on bilateral aid 
allocation. Variables that directly relate to poverty reduction, such as literacy rate, infant 
mortality rate, and income inequality were not popular determinants as well. Bilateral 
aid distribution in general is dictated by donor interests far more than the need of 
recipient countries. In order to maximize aid effectiveness and create a favorable 
environment for developing countries to reduce poverty and work toward the 
Millennium Development Goals, bilateral aid should be used as genuine tool for growth 
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